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Abstract
This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market
deregulated by privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding
competition in the privatization stage is necessary but not suﬃcient for reaching an
eﬃcient equilibrium market structure. Competition in the ensuing entry stage is
also necessary. Otherwise, one ﬁrm can induce another to take the role of the weak
ﬁrm in the subsequent product market competition, by making concessions in the
bidding in the privatization auction. It is also shown that Employment Guarantees
may ”help” the buyer of the privatized ﬁrm ”abstain” from investing and by that
creating a less competitive market structure.
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During the last decades we have witnessed large privatizations and deregulation programs
all over the world.1 These programs has been carried out in many diﬀerent sectors of the
economy, including the manufacturing sector, utility and communication services and the
ﬁnancial sector.2 An important ingredient in many of these programs has been the use of
auctions to allocate productive assets to the most eﬃcient owner and thereby contribute
to the creation of eﬃcient market structures. However, it is a fear that many of these
privatization and deregulation programs have not lead to a fast creation of eﬃcient market
structures. For instance, while recent empirical evidence shows the long-run impact of
privatization on ﬁrms’ productivity in transition countries to have been mainly positive, it
has also been acknowledged that the positive impact has taken time3 and that ownership
identity is of importance.4 For instance, new investments in and radical reorganizations
of product lines and processes were - at least in the early stages -only observed in foreign-
owned enterprises.5.
In this paper we argue, that the obstacle to the creation of eﬃcient market structures is
consistent with an ineﬃciency in asset ownership allocation, depending on a non-obvious
weakness in privatization design. More speciﬁcally, we show that if a privatization takes
place through an auction6,a ni n e ﬃcient owner might obtain the state assets even though
1Privatization and deregulation activities are driven by factors such as a general trend of reducing
the state in the economy, budgetary constraints, a need for attracting investments and a combination of
technological change, liberalization and globalization of product and ﬁnancial markets (OECD (2000)).
2Many countries also announce substantial forthcoming privatizations. Planned privatizations suggest
that privatization proceeds will remain strong through continued activitities in Europe and Asia. Examples
of countries with large privatization plans are China, Japan, Portugal, Thailand and Turkey (OECD
(2000)).
3Estrin (2002).
4Djankel and Murrell (2000) conclude: ”Privatization to workers is detrimental, privatization to diﬀuse
individual owners has no eﬀect and privatization to funds or foreigners has a large positive eﬀect.”
5Carlin and Landesmann (1997).
6In practise, diﬀerent types of measures have been used to privatize former state-owned enterprises.
2more eﬃcient owners are present as potential buyers. In the model, a state-owned enter-
prise is initially located in the market. It is assumed that the government will liberalize
the market by: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii) allowing for new plants to be opened by
private investors, i.e. abolishing investment restrictions. In the ﬁrst stage, the state assets
are sold at an auction, with two potential buyers. There is an eﬃcient owner, for example
a ﬁrm which ﬁrm speciﬁc assets match well with the assets for sale, the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
in a related industry or the market leader in the world market. There is also an ineﬃcient
owner, which could be a less eﬃcient ﬁrm, a ﬁrm which ﬁrm-speciﬁca s s e t sd o e sn o tm a t c h
well with the assets for sale, former worker or the former management team, or an inactive
pension fund. The eﬃcient owner is assumed to face lower variable production costs when
using the state assets due to its access to superior technology or knowledge. In the second
stage, the owners may invest by setting up a new plant, where the eﬃcient technology is
used. Here, it is assumed that the ineﬃcient owner will now have the time to introduce a
more updated or appropriate technology, and may do so if this is proﬁtable. In the third
stage, the owners compete in Cournot fashion where the ineﬃcient owner faces a higher
production cost if only using the state assets in its production.
We show that for a suﬃciently large diﬀerence in variable production cost when using
state assets, the ineﬃcient owner obtains the state assets, whereas when such cost diﬀer-
ences are low, the eﬃcient owner obtains the state assets. The reason why the eﬃcient
owner chooses costly investment in new assets and lets the ineﬃcient owner obtain the
state assets, is that it will then face a competitor with higher costs in the ensuing product
market competition. As we show, this follows from the ineﬃcient owner investing in new
assets, if and only if not obtaining the state assets. Moreover, the ineﬃcient owner beneﬁts
Several western countries employed various kinds of auctions to sell state-owned enterprises to the highest
bidder. In some transition countries, a substantial fraction of the shares of all ﬁrms were given to the
general population for free. Most privatization programs combined several elements of these basic methods.
See Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997).
3from ”taking on” a weak market position, since it is compensated by a low acquisition
price. However, when the ineﬃcient owners costs are low, the eﬃcient owner obtains the
state assets, since the ineﬃcient owner will now be a relative tough competitor also when
using the state assets. This result illustrates how the auction ”helps” the owners achieve
the, for them, most advantageous market structure. By making concessions in the bidding,
one owner can induce the other to take on the role of the weak owner in the subsequent
product market competition.7
It is also shown that when the number of eﬃcient owners participating in the investment
game increases, the risk of having an ineﬃcient buyer decreases. The reason is that an
eﬃcient owner then faces the risk of not being able to enter the market at all, when not
entering through acquisition. It has been acknowledged that traditional antitrust concerns
such as preventing collusive, predatory and entry deterring behavior are important for
successfully designing an auction in practise.8 Here, we show another possible type of
collusive behavior that might be a problem: when the auction is followed by an entry
game into the same market bidding competition in the privatization stage is necessary but
not suﬃcient, competition in the investment entry stage is also required. Otherwise, the
auction could be used as a collusive devise to avoid tough product market competition.
The paper also throws some light on other issues in relation to privatizations. A ma-
jor concern in privatization programs is the protection of employment. The practice of
”Employment guarantees” when selling former state assets in order to ensure future em-
ployment has been fairly widespread.9 However, it is shown that Employment Guarantees
can be counterproductive in the sense of implying that a less eﬃcient owner obtains the
7T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fc r e a t i n gap r o ﬁtable market structure and selecting the right competitor has been
acknowledged in the business literature. For instance, Porter (1998) writes: ”While competitors can surely
be threats, the right competitors can strengthen rather than weaken a ﬁrm’s competitive position in many
industries”.
8See Klemperer (2002).
9For instance, in Eastern Germany, the Treuhandanstalt bargained on the terms of trade and negotiated
employment and investment guarantees (Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997).
4privatized ﬁrm. The intuition is that the Employment Guarantee helps the buyer of the
state-assets ”abstain” from investing, thereby creating a less competitive market structure
with less total employment.
To our knowledge, no paper in the theoretical privatization literature or auction litera-
ture evaluates the selling of scarce assets in a situation where asymmetric potential buyers
can invest in new capital and compete in an oligopoly.10
The model is spelled out in Section 2 and in Section 3, we derive the equilibrium
ownership structure. In Section 4, policy issues are discussed and Section 5 concludes.
Finally, most proofs appear in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a country where the market has previously been served by a state enterprise, but
which will now be open to private investments. It is assumed that the government will
liberalize the market through a program with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state
assets, and (ii) allowing for new plants to be opened by abolishing investment restrictions.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 2.1, the interaction takes place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
the government sells the state assets, denoted kS, in one piece at an auction where the two
investors are the potential buyers. There is an eﬃcient owner, owner e, for example the
most eﬃcient ﬁrm in a related industry or the market leader in the world market. There
is also an ineﬃcient owner, owner i, which could be a less eﬃcient ﬁrm, a ﬁrm which ﬁrm-
10For overviews of the privatization literature see, for instance, Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997) and
Vickers and Yarrow (1991).
Few papers in the theoretical auction literature deal with the situation where the potential buyers
are ex-ante asymmetric ﬁrms competing in an oligopoly. Exceptions are, among others, Chen (2000),
Ghemawat (1990), Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996a, 2000), and Krishna (1993). However, to our knowledge,
no paper deals with determining the equilibrium buyer in a situation where the potential buyers could
also invest in new capital. An exemption is Norbäck and Persson (2003). However, the focus in that paper
is to study the pattern of foreign and domestic acquisitions in an international oligopoly.
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Figure 2.1: The structure of the model.
speciﬁc assets does not match well with the assets for sale, former worker or the former
management team, or an inactive pension fund. The eﬃcient owner is assumed to face
lower variable production costs when using the state assets due to its access to superior
technology or knowledge. In the second stage, the owners may invest by setting up a
new plant, denoted kN,w h e r et h ee ﬃcient technology is used. Here, it is assumed that
the ineﬃcient owner will now have the time to introduce a more updated or appropriate
t e c h n o l o g y ,a n dm a yd os oi ft h i si sp r o ﬁtable. To simplify the analysis, investment is
assumed to be a dichotomous choice. Finally, in the third stage, owners compete in
Cournot fashion in the product market.
Section 2.1 describes the oligopoly market, and the following section presents the in-
vestment game and the privatization procedure.
2.1. The Oligopoly market
In the third stage, owners compete in oligopoly fashion in a homogenous good market. Let
πD
h (ch,c j) denote the the reduced-form duopoly proﬁtf o ro w n e rh = {e,i},w h e no w n e rh
6faces a variable cost ch and owner j faces a variable cost cj. We assume ﬁrm h’s proﬁtt o








We deﬁne cmax as the c satisfying qh(c,0) = 0 and πM
h (ch) as denoting the monopoly
proﬁt when the monopolist faces a production cost, ch. Assumption 1 should be fulﬁlled
in most oligopoly models. In the appendix, we show that our results derived below extend
into Cournot as well as Bertrand competition.
In Lemma 1, it is shown that the state assets will be sold at the auction in equilibrium.
As illustrated by Figure 2.1, this implies that six diﬀerent market structures are to be
considered. To keep track of these, we denote the market structure as M(ke,k i).F o r
example, a market structure where owner e owns the state assets and owner i owns new
assets is denoted M(kS,k N).T h e l a s t r o w i n ﬁgure 2.1 refers to the owners’ marginal
costs in the diﬀerent market structures. The ineﬃcient owner, i, is assumed to face a
variable production cost, c, when only owning state assets, whereas the eﬃcient owner, e,
is then assumed to produce at a zero cost. An owner h possessing one unit of new assets
i sa s s u m e dt op r o d u c ea taz e r ov a r i a b l ec o s t .H e n c e ,w ea r et a k i n gt h es i m p l i ﬁcation that
eﬃcient and ineﬃcient owners only diﬀer in their ability to use state assets. However, it
can be shown that the results also hold for diﬀerences in the ability to use (or diﬀerences
in the cost of investing into) new assets. This is disussed more in Section 4.1.2.
2.2. The greenﬁeld investments
At this stage, the owners might undertake investment at a ﬁxed cost, G.A no w n e r( ﬁrm)
then faces a zero production cost. To solve the investment game, we transform the game
in Figure 2.1 into its normal form. This is done in Figure 2.2, where Figure 2.2(i) depicts
the investment game when the ineﬃcient owner i obtains the state assets, whereas Figure
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Figure 2.2: Solving the investment game.
8Appendix, we derive the Nash-Equilibria11 w h i c ha r es h o w ni nF i g u r e s2 . 2 ( i i i ) - ( i v ) . F o r
example, {I,N} denotes the Nash-Equilibrium where owner e is investing greenﬁeld (I),
whereas the ineﬃcient owner i is not (N).
Turning to Figure 2.2(iv), it follows directly that the eﬃcient owner e,a st h eb u y e ro f
the state assets, has no incentive to invest. The ineﬃcient owner i i n v e s t sa sl o n ga st h e
investment costs are recovered. Given that ﬁrm e is not investing (indicated by subscript
N), ¯ Gn
i,N = πD
i (0,0) is the critical value of the investment cost G,s u c ht h a to w n e ri,w h e n
not acquiring the state assets (indicated by superscript n), is indiﬀerent between investing
and not.
T u r n i n gt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h ei n e ﬃcient owner i obtains the state assets in Figure
2.2(iii), ¯ Ga
i,I = πD
i (0,0) − πD
i (c,0) denotes the threshold value of the investment cost for
the ineﬃcient owner i (where a now indicates the acquirer), given that the eﬃcient owner
e has invested (indicated by subscript I). Above this threshold, the ineﬃcient owner i
will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in additional new assets when owning the state assets.
Similarly, we deﬁne ¯ Ga
i,N = πM
i (0) − πM
i (c), ¯ Gn
e,I = πD
e (0,0) and ¯ Gn
e,N = πD
e (0,c).
2.3. The privatization procedure
In order to focus on the market forces as the determinants of the equilibrium buyer and
the equilibrium market structure, we assume that the government sells the state assets to
the highest bidder at an auction.12 More speciﬁcally, the privatization process is depicted
as an auction where the two owners simultaneously post bids and the bidder with the
highest bid obtains the state assets. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to his bid.
11Risk dominance is used to select between multiple equilibria, indicated {ME} in Figure 2.2(iii).
12In practise, diﬀerent types of measures have been used to privatize former state-owned enterprises.
Several western countries employed various kinds of auctions to sell state-owned enterprises to the highest
bidder. In some transition countries, a substantial fraction of the shares of all ﬁrms was given to the
general population for free. In Eastern Germany, the Treuhandanstalt bargained on the terms of trade
and negotiated employment and investment guarantees. Most privatization programs combined several
elements of these basic methods. See Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997).
9The auctions will be solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.13
Let us now turn to the owners’ valuations of an arbitrary distribution of the state
assets. Generally, these valuations do not only depend on the identity of owner h, but
also on the identity of the owner that will obtain the assets if owner h does not. Some
notation is required in order to deﬁne an owner’s valuation. We let πhj denote the proﬁt
made by owner h when owner j has acquired the state assets and πhh the proﬁtm a d eb y
owner h when it has acquired the state assets itself. Then, the valuation for owner h, vhj,
is deﬁned as
Deﬁnition 1. vhj ≡ πhh − πhj.
Lemma 1 identiﬁes the equilibrium buyer in the auction:
Lemma 1. Let owner h be the owner with the highest valuation. The state assets are
then acquired by owner h,a tap r i c ee q u a lt ot h eo t h e ro w n e r ’ s ,o w n e rj’s, valuation of
obtaining the state assets instead of owner i, vjh.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3. Asset ownership
In this section we determine the equilibrium ownership structure and study how it depend
on diﬀerence in cost eﬃciency and investment costs. The game is solved backwards, by
forming the respective owners’ valuations based on the outcome of the investment game
in Figures 2.2(iii)-(iv).
13There is assumed to be a smallest monetary unit, denoted ε. We assume ties to be randomly broken,
and all equalities in valuations to be ruled out. The smallest amount ε is chosen such that all inequalities
are preserved, if ε is added or subtracted.
103.1. The equilibrium asset ownership structure
One more deﬁnition is required to proceed. To this end, consider the situation where only
the non-acquirer will investment in new assets. Let c∗ be the value of the ineﬃcient owner
i:s production cost satisfying the following equality: vei = πD
e (0,0) − (πD
e (0,c) − G)=
πD
i (c,0)−(πD
i (0,0)−G)=vie.T h u s ,c∗ is the production cost of owner i,a tw h i c ho w n e r
e’s and owner i’s valuations of the state assets coincide, given that only the non-acquirer
invests in new assets. In Table 3.1, we derive the owners’ valuations, the equilibrium
buyer, the equilibrium market structure and the equilibrium auction price.
Table 3.1: Deriving the Equilibrium Market Structure (EMS).
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11Proposition 1. (a) When investment costs are high , the eﬃcient owner e obtains the
state assets. (b) At intermediate investment costs and suﬃciently large diﬀerences in
variable production cost between the eﬃcient owner e and the ineﬃcient owner i when
using state assets, the ineﬃcient owner i obtains the state assets. (c) At low investment
costs, the eﬃcient owner e obtains the state assets.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1(ii) contains several noteworthy features.
First, in the case where greenﬁeld costs are high, i.e. when the buyer of the state assets
becomes a monopolist, the Lemma shows that owner e,t h ee ﬃcient owner, obtains the
assets. The reason is that a more eﬃcient monopolist is willing to pay more for becoming
the monopolist than an ineﬃcient monopolist.
Second, in the case where greenﬁeld costs are medium high, either owner e or owner
i obtains the assets, depending on the variable production cost diﬀerence between them.
The reason why the eﬃcient owner e chooses costly investment in new assets and lets the
ineﬃcient owner i obtain the state assets when the diﬀerence in variable production cost
is high, is that it will then face a competitor with higher costs in the ensuing product
market competition. However, when the ineﬃcient owners costs are low, the eﬃcient
owner obtains the state assets, since the ineﬃcient owner will now be a relatively tough
competitor also when using the state assets.
Third, in the case where greenﬁeld costs are low, owner e obtains the state assets: The
reason is that if owner e obtains the state assets it will not invest greenﬁeld. This implies
that owner e’s willingness to pay is G. If the ineﬃcient owner i obtains the state assets,
both the ineﬃcient (as well as the eﬃcient owner) will invest in new assets and thus, the
ineﬃcient owner’s willingness to pay is zero.14
14These results hold, for instance, in a Cournot model with homogeneous products, where ﬁrms either
face concave or strictly concave demand, P0(Q) < 0 and P00(Q) ≤ 0. Our results also extend to Bertrand
competition with diﬀerentiated goods, using the model of Deneckere and Davidson (1985), where ﬁrm h
faces the demand qh = a − Ph − γ(Ph − 1
2 (Ph + Pj)). For further details, see the Appendix.
123.1.1. Why do large cost diﬀerences lead to the ineﬃcient owner obtaining the
state assets?
First, note that the auction mechanism implies that the owner with the highest valuation
obtains the state assets. Then, note that vhj >v jh iﬀ πhh + πjh >π jj + πhj,s ot h a t
vhj >v jh iﬀ Πh > Πj,w h e r eΠh is the aggregate proﬁtw h e no w n e rh obtains the state
assets and Πj is the aggregate proﬁtw h e no w n e rj obtains them. Thus, through the
auction mechanism, owners will choose the buyer whose possession of the state assets will
lead to the highest aggregate proﬁt. It turns out that maximum aggregate proﬁti sn o t
always the most cost eﬃcient market structure. To see why, we examine how the level of
costs for the ineﬃcient owner c aﬀects the aggregate proﬁts in a duopoly.
The aggregate proﬁt under ineﬃcient ownership is given by Πi(c), corresponding to
the U-shaped curve in ﬁgure 3.1(i). Note that this aggregate proﬁt can then be expressed
as Πi(c)=P(qi + qe)qi + P(qi + qe)qe − cqi. As shown in the Appendix, under Cournot










c − qi. (3.1)
The ﬁr s tt e r mi nE q u a t i o n( 3 . 1 )c a p t u r e st h eanti-competitive eﬀect:a ni n c r e a s e dc o s t
induces the ineﬃcient owner to be less aggressive in the product market, which increases
the revenues for the eﬃcient owner. The second term reﬂects the decrease in total pro-
duction costs, as the eﬃcient owner steals business from the ineﬃcient owner, an eﬀect
referred to as the business stealing eﬀect. The third term, the direct production cost eﬀect,
reduces the aggregate proﬁts relative to the initial position, as the ineﬃcient owner faces
higher production costs.
Whether aggregate proﬁts are maximized with the eﬃcient or the ineﬃcient owner as
the buyer, depends on the balance between the incentive to form Πe(0) to avoid the higher
production cost, and the anti-competitive and business stealing incentive to form Πi(c).
Comparing Πe(0) and Πi(c) in Figure 3.1(i), we can state the following Lemma, giving rise
to the market structure in the shaded Region 2 of Figure 3.1(ii).
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Figure 3.1: The Equilibrium Market Structure (EMS).
14Lemma 2. (i) Πe > Πi when c<c ∗. (ii) Πi > Πe when c>c ∗.
Proof. See the Appendix
In general, the auction mechanism takes into consideration the “opportunity cost”
of an acquisition. For instance, it might be the case that ”allocating” the asset to one
owner might create the most eﬃcient acquirer, although the “opportunity cost” of creating
this acquirer may be higher, since this may imply that a more attractive non-acquirer is
foregone. Since the auction mechanism takes these aspects into consideration, the most
eﬃcient acquirer is not necessarily created.
3.1.2. Net proﬁts and cost diﬀerences
Let us now turn to how the diﬀerent owners’ net proﬁts depend on the diﬀerences in
variable production costs. Then, deﬁne the net-proﬁts as Λh(ch,c j)=πD
h (ch,c j) − Φh,
where Φh are ﬁrm h’s ﬁxed costs in the form of the acquisition price A and/or ﬁxed
investment costs G. In Figure 3.1 (iii), the net proﬁts of owners e and i, respectively, are
depicted in the case of high greenﬁeld costs.
First, consider the situation where the ineﬃcient owner i’s costs are relatively low. In
this interval, owner e, obtains the assets and owner e’s net proﬁti n c r e a s e si nt h ei n e ﬃcient
owner i’s costs. The reason is that the eﬃcient owner e’s equilibrium product market proﬁt
is unaﬀected by owner i’s cost, but the ineﬃcient owner i’s willingness to pay decreases
since its value of the assets decreases. The ineﬃcient owner i’s net proﬁti st h u su n a ﬀected
s i n c ei td o e sn o ta ﬀe c tt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt.
Second, consider the situation where the ineﬃcient owner i’s costs are relatively high.
In this interval, the ineﬃcient owner i obtains the assets and both the eﬃcient owner e’s
and the ineﬃcient owner i’s net proﬁt increases in owner i’s costs. The reason is that
despite the ineﬃcient owner i’s product market proﬁt decreases, the eﬃcient owner e’s
willingness to pay (and hence the acquistion price), decreases even more.
The latter follows from the ineﬃcient owner investing in new assets if and only if
15not obtaining the state assets. Hence, the ineﬃcient owner beneﬁts from ”taking on” a
weak market position, since it is compensated by a low acquisition price. This is also
illustrated in Figure 3.1(iii), where it can be noted that both ﬁrms earn net-proﬁts ex-
ceeding the proﬁts made in a case where both ﬁrm utilize new assets, i.e. they earn
positive proﬁts compared to a (hypothetical) case where the state assets are liquidated,
Λe(0,c) >π D
e (0,0) − G and Λi(c,0) >π D
i (0,0) − G for c>c ∗.
4. Policy
In previous section, we have shown that the buyer’s identity and the auction price in the
present analysis are intricately dependent on detailed ﬁrm characteristics. This implies
that the optimal design of policy is very complicated and requires considerable information.
In Section 4.1, we therefore illustrate two diﬀerent mechanisms for competition to promote
an eﬃcient outcome in the auction. In Section 4.2 we study how labor protection policies
in practise may aﬀect the buyer’s identity and the selling price in the privatization.
4.1. Competition and eﬃcient ownership
In this section, we show how competition will decrease the possibility for the auction is
used by the owners as a collusive devise to achieve a less competitive market structure.
This involves extending the model to more than two (asymmetric) owners. Deriving a
full solution to such an extended model is very involved. Therefore, we will sketch two
diﬀerent mechanisms through which competition will promote an eﬃcient outcome.
4.1.1. Strengthening competition for the market
Competition for the market may promote eﬃciency. Suppose that there are E symmetric,
eﬃcient, owners and I symmetric, ineﬃcient, owners competing to enter the emerging
market, either by acquiring the state assets or investing greenﬁeld. As above, ineﬃcient
owners face a marginal cost, c, when acquiring state assets and not investing, whereas
16investing gives a zero marginal cost, which is also the marginal cost for eﬃcient owners.
Throughout the analysis in this section, we retain the assumption that it is only prof-
itable for the non-acquirer to invest in new assets, that is, we remain in the parameter
setting corresponding to that of Region 2 in Figure 3.1(ii). We assume that the probability
of succeeding in investing, conditional on not acquiring the state assets is ρ(M)= 1
M−1,
where M = E+I, and where limited entry may be caused by a combination of insuﬃcient
demand, ﬁxed costs and imperfect knowledge of the market, all of which can be avoided
by an acquisition.15 Let πh(ch,c j) be the (duopoly) product market proﬁtf o ro w n e rh
facing the marginal cost ch when the marginal cost of h’s competitor is cj. Since there
are two types of owners, there are four valuations to consider. vii(vie) is the value for
an ineﬃcient owner when an ineﬃcient (eﬃcient) owner would otherwise obtain the state
assets. vee (vei) is the corresponding values for an eﬃcient owner. The valuations can then
b ew r i t t e na si nt a b l e4 . 1 .
Table 4.1: Valuations in the extended model.
Valuation: Deﬁnition:
vii : πi(c,0) − ρ(M)[πi(0,c) − G]
˜ vie : πi(c,0) − ρ(M)[πi(0,0) − G]
˜ vee : πe(0,0) − ρ(M)[πe(0,0) − G]
˜ vei : πe(0,0) − ρ(M)[πe(0,c) − G]
It follows directly from our assumptions on marginal costs that product market proﬁts
c a nb er a n k e da sf o l l o w s :πh(0,c) >π h(0,0) >π i(c,0) > 0. This, in turn, implies that
there are only two possible orderings of the valuations to consider:
It follows that, under inequality I1, the unique equilibrium is that of an eﬃcient owner
e acquiring the state assets. However, multiple equilibria exist under I2 : one is that an
15Our results in this section can also be extended beyond assuming duopoly in the product market
competition. Proofs are available from the authors.
17Table 4.2: Valuations in the extended model.
Inequality Deﬁnition EB
I1˜ vee > ˜ vei > ˜ vie > ˜ vii e
I2˜ vee > ˜ vie > ˜ vei > ˜ vii e or i
eﬃcient owner e is the acquirer, the other that an ineﬃcient owner i is the acquirer. Hence,
even an auction with bidding competition among several potential owners may result in
ineﬃcient ownership of the state assets. However, when competition in the investment
game increases, this will tend to generate eﬃcient ownership. To see this, note that:
lim
ρ→0vie = πi(c,0) < lim
ρ→0vei = πi(0,0),( 4 . 1 )
where we are modelling increased competition in the investment game as a decrease in the
probability of successful greenﬁeld investment ρ, due to a larger pool of potential entrants,
M. Hence, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose that there exists a threshold probability of greenﬁeld entry ρ∗
such that vie(ρ∗,·)=vei(ρ∗,·).T h e n , a t ρ>ρ ∗,a ni n e ﬃcient owner obtains the state
assets, whereas at ρ<ρ ∗,a ne ﬃcient owner may obtain the state assets.
The proposition thus illustrates that the risk of owners strategically using the auction
to limit the production competition is reduced when more owners contemplate entering
the market than would be proﬁtable. Consequently, it is important for the authority to
attract a suﬃcient number of potential investors for the market both in the privatization
stage as well as in the investment stage. Competition in the privatization stage is not
suﬃcient, there must also be suﬃcient competition for the whole market.16
16It might be argued that more greenﬁeld entrants could enter the market under ineﬃcient ownership of
the former state assets, since product market competition is then weaker. This would decrease the value
of having a high cost ﬁrm in the market.
184.1.2. Strengthening competition in the market
C o m p e t i t i o nf o rt h em a r k e tm a yp r o m o t ee ﬃciency. Here it assumed that all M = E + I
owners enter the market, one by acquisition and the remaining by new investments.As
before, we remain in the parameter setting corresponding to that of Region 2 in Figure
3.1(ii). We can then derive the following result:
Proposition 3. (i) Increasing the product market competition beyond duopoly leads to
eﬃcient ownership in the Linear Cournot Model, (ii) increasing the product market com-
petition beyond triopoly leads to eﬃcient ownership in the Linear Bertrand Model.
Proof. See, the Appendix.
In the appendix, we show that the main features of the non-linear tendency for an asym-
metric market structure to produce higher proﬁts (manifested by the anti-competitive,-
business-stealing, and direct cost saving eﬀects in Figure 3.1(i)) are also present with more
active ﬁrms in the product market. However, the strengthened product market competi-
tion also promotes an eﬃcient allocation of asset ownership. In the linear Cournot model,
triopoly and less concentrated market structures lead to eﬃcient ownership, whereas
quadropoly is required to guarantee eﬃcient ownership in the linear Bertrand model.17
T h er e a s o ni st h a ta ni n e ﬃcient ownership of state assets vanishes as this owner cannot
make a proﬁt in an environment with several producers with a low marginal cost.
This result is, however, based on the assumption that ineﬃcient and eﬃcient owners
are equally eﬃcient in using new assets. While simplifying the analysis, this is a strong
assumption. A more realistic assumption is that the eﬃcient owner could use both state
assets and new assets more eﬃciently. As we show in the Appendix, ineﬃcient owner-
ship then extends beyond duopoly in a linear Cournot model (since competition is less
intense with competitors being both eﬃcient, as well as, ineﬃcient ﬁrms with new assets).
However, it is still the case that strengthened product market competition promotes an
eﬀective use of the state assets.
17Proofs are available upon request.
19The results in this section thus illustrates that the risk of owners strategically using
the auction to limit the production competition is reduced when competition is strong in
the product market. Consequently, it is important for the authority to ensure that entry
into the market is facilitated, not only to increase the number of the ﬁrms in the industry
but also to improve the outcome in the privatization.
4.2. Employment Policies
In some situations, future commitments to employment after a privatization are negoti-
ated.18 Such commitments might imply that production cannot be run as eﬃciently as
otherwise would be the case. Thus, the production costs might increase by such commit-
ment. However, this policy might not only have direct eﬀects, but might also aﬀect the
equilibrium market structure. To see this, assume the setting with two owners in section
2 and that we are in the equilibrium where only the non-acquirer invests in period 2 (Re-
gion 2 in Figure 3.1) and where the eﬃcient owner obtains the state assets. Suppose now
that the government requires future employment commitments which increase the variable
production cost when using the state assets. As shown in the Appendix, a small increase
in variable production costs might then imply that the ineﬃcient owner obtains the state
assets. Since it will be a more harmless competitor, the eﬃcient owner lets it obtain the
state assets at a very low price. This implies that the ineﬃcient owner will now abstain
from investing in new assets and might therefore reduce its production and possibly also its
total employment. The Employment Guarantee can thereby reduce welfare. Accordingly,
we have the following results:
Proposition 4. (i) Employment Guarantees in a privatized ﬁrm may imply that a less ef-
ﬁcient owner obtains the privatized ﬁrm and could thereby lead to lower total employment
in the market.
18For example, in Poland, the acquisition of a telecommunication equipment manufacturer by Siemens
guaranteed continued employment for an 18-month period. (See World Investment Report, 2000.)
20On the other hand, if it is less costly for the ineﬃcient owner to keep the old work
force, this type of policy will have the opposite eﬀect.
5. Concluding discussion
This paper determines the equilibrium market structure in an emerging market. It is shown
that bidding competition in the privatization stage is necessary but not suﬃcient for having
an eﬃcient buyer and thereby an eﬃcient equilibrium market structure. Competition in
the ensuing entry stage is also required. Otherwise, one owner can induce another to take
the role of the weak owner in the subsequent product market competition, by making
concessions in the bidding in the privatization auction. Consequently, it is important
that the authority not only ensures that there is competition for the privatized ﬁrm but
also reduces the pre-investment cost for owners contemplating investing in the liberalized
market in general.
T h ep a p e ra l s op o i n t st ot h ef a c tt h a tE m p l o y m e n tG u a r a n t e e sc a nb ec o u n t e r p r o -
ductive in the sense of implying that a less eﬃcient owner obtains the privatized ﬁrm.
The intuition is that the Employment Guarantee helps the buyer of the state-assets to
”abstain” from investing, thereby creating a less competitive market structure with less
total employment. Consequently, it is important that authorities consider all potential
investors’ incentives for investment when designing investment and employment policies.
The issue of the optimal design of the privatization policy has not been addressed here.
The complexity of the externalities involved in the selling of the state assets indicates
that informational constraint will be important for deriving optimal policies. A natural
step, however, is to explicitly model this restriction and investigate whether selling rules
incurring a higher welfare level might be found.
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A. Appendix: Solving the investment game
The solution when the eﬃcient owner obtains the state assets follows directly since not
investing (N) is a dominant strategy for the eﬃcient owner. Let us therefore proceed to
the case when the ineﬃcient owner obtains the state assets. Making use of the critical
investment cost deﬁn e di nt h et e x t ,i . e . ¯ Ga
i,I = πD
i (0,0)−πD






e (0,0) and ¯ Gn
e,N = πD
e (0,c),d e ﬁne inequalities 1a-4a for the eﬃcient owner, and
inequalities 1b-4b for the ineﬃcient owner in table A.1. For each such pair of inequalities,
table A.1 provides the associated Nash-equilibria, where the pair of inequalities fulﬁlled
in Figure 2.2(iii) are marked in bold.
Under inequalities 4a and 4b, multiple equilibria arise. There is a mixed equilibrium
{ ,θ} where owner e invests with probability   and the ineﬃcient owner invests with
probability θ, but also two asymmetric equilibria {I,N} and {N,I}. Assuming away the
mixed equilibrium and using risk-dominance, it can be shown that only equilibrium {N,I}
remains.
To see this, suppose that {I,N} is preferred to {N,I}. Then, according to the criteria












































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ei n f o r m a t i o ni nF i g u r e2 . 2( i ) . H o w e v e r ,n o t et h a tπD
e (0,c) −
πD
e (0,0) > 0 holds, and that πD
i (c,0) − G − πM
i (c) < 0.H e n c e ,i tm u s tb et h a t{ N , I }i s
preferred by the owners.
Table A.1: Solving the investment game when the ineﬀcient ﬁrm i acquires the state assets.
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B .A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Let vh >v j without loss of generality. First, consider the equilibrium candidate where
ﬁrm i acquires the state assets. Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗,w h e r eb∗
h >b ∗
j,
24j 6= h. Let owner h be the owner obtaining the state assets. Note that b∗
h >v h is a
weakly dominated strategy, since no owner will post a bid over its maximum valuation of
obtaining the assets. If b∗
h <v j, ﬁrm j beneﬁts from deviating to b∗∗
j = b∗
h + ε, since it
then obtains the assets and pays a price for the assets lower than its valuation of obtaining
them. Last, consider candidate b∗
h = vj,b ∗
j = vj − ε. Then, no owner has an incentive to
deviate. Thus, this is a Nash equilibrium and the only NE where ﬁrm i obtains the assets.
Let us now show that this is the only Nash equilibrium. First, consider the situation
where ﬁrm j obtains the assets. Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗,w h e r eb∗
j >b ∗
h,
j 6= h. B u tw ek n o wt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u m ,b∗
j <v j,s i n c eﬁrm j otherwise plays a weakly
dominated strategy. But if b∗
j <v j, ﬁrm i beneﬁts from deviating to b∗∗
h = b∗
j + ε, since it
then obtains the assets and pays a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. Thus,
ﬁrm j obtaining the assets is not an equilibrium.
Second, note that the situation where neither ﬁrm i nor ﬁrm j obtains the assets cannot
occur if there is no reservation price at the auction.
C. Appendix: Deriving the Equilibrium Market Structure
C.1. Region 1 in table 3.1: G<G a
i,I
From Figure 2.2(iii), we note that under ineﬃcient ownership both ﬁrms invest greenﬁeld,
whereas under eﬃcient ownership, as illustrated in Figure 2.2(iv), only ﬁrm i invests. The
ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation is then vie = πD
i (0,0) − G −
¡
πD
i (0,0) − G
¢
=0 ,w h e r e a st h e




e (0,0) − G
¢
= G.S i n c evie−vei = −G<0,
this leads to an eﬃcient acquisition at the price A = vie =0and the market structure is
M(kS,k N).
C.2. Region 2 in table 3.1: Ga
i,I <G<G n
e,I, 0 <c<c max
This is the case discussed in the main text. From Figure 2.2(iii), we note that under
ineﬃcient ownership only the eﬃcient ﬁrms i invest greenﬁeld, whereas under eﬃcient
25ownership, as illustrated in Figure 2.2(iv), both ﬁrms invests. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s val-
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e (0,c) − G
¢¤
(C.1)
= Πi(c) − Πe(0),
where Πi(c)=πD
i (c,0)+πD
e (0,c)+G is the aggregate proﬁt under domestic ownership of
the state assets and Πe(0) = πD
i (0,0)+πD
e (0,0))+G is the aggregate proﬁtu n d e rf o r e i g n
ownership. Hence, c only aﬀect’s the proﬁts under domestic ownership. To study how
vie − vei reacts to changes in c, we can simply explore the aggregate proﬁts Πi(c). Firms’
proﬁts under a domestic acquisition are then πe = P(qe +qi)qf and πi = P(qe +qi)qi −cqi
and the associated FOCs are :
∂πe
∂qe




= P + P
0qi − c =0 (C.3)








D < 0 and
dQ
dc = P0
D < 0,w h e r eD = P0 [3P0 + P00Q] > 0 and Q = qe + qi.W e
can then deﬁne the aggregate proﬁts as a function of c:
Πi(c)=πe(qe(c),q i(c),c)+πi(qe(c),q i(c),c). (C.4)





























26C.2.2. Proving Lemma 2


























We then proceed by deriving the following Lemmas:
Lemma 3. (i)
dΠi
dc (0) < 0, (ii) Πi(cmax) > Πi(0), and (iii) Πi(c) has a global minimum c
for c ∈ [0,c max].
Proof. If demand P(Q) is concave βQ ≥ 0 and βqe ≥ 0, since P0 < 0 and P00 ≤ 0. Then:
(i) At c =0 ,w em u s th a v eqe = qi, which implies that
dΠi
dc (0) = −q
2+βQ
3+βQ < 0.
(ii) At c = cmax,o w n e r i becomes a monopolist and thus, Πi(cmax) > Πi(0).
(iii) Deﬁne ˜ c by
dΠi
dc (˜ c)=0 .
Once more, note that
dΠi
dc (0) < 0. Also, note that lim
ε→0
dΠi
dc (cmax−ε) > 0. Then, since qe−
qi is monotonically increasing in c,w h e r e a s
2P0+P00Q
2P0+P00qeqi is strictly positive and monotonically




only changes once and hence, the aggregate
proﬁt Πi(c) has a unique global minimum at c =˜ c.
It then follows that vie − vei < 0 for c<c ∗,l e a d i n gt oa ne ﬃcient acquisition at the
price A = vie and to a market structure M(kS,k N). It also follows that, that vie −vei > 0
for c>c ∗, leading to an ineﬃcient acquisition at the price A = vie and to a market
structure M(kN,k S).
C.2.3. Investigating net proﬁts
Here, we derive Figure 3.1 (iii) algebraically.
First, consider the case when c>c ∗. For the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, note that:
Λi = π
D







e (0,0) − (π
D
e (0,c) − G)
¤
= Πi(c) − Πe(0) + π
D
i (0,0) − G
27where we may directly note that: Λi >π D
i (0,0) − G s i n c ew eh a v es h o w na b o v et h a t
Πi(c) − Πe(0) > 0 for c>c ∗.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e
dΠi(c)
dc > 0 for c>c ∗,i ta l s oh o l d st h a t
dΛi
dc > 0. T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬃcient ﬁrm:
Λe = π
D
e (0,c) − G>π
D
e (0,0) − G





Finally, take the case when c<c ∗. Then, note that:
Λe = π
D







i (c,0) − (π
D




e (0,0) − π
D
i (c,0) + π
D
i (0,0) − G>
π
D
e (0,0) − G
since πD
e (0,0) −G = πD




dc > 0. Finally, looking
at the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, we have simply have Λi = πD
i (0,0) − G.
C.2.4. Linear Bertrand and Cournot models
In this section, we show that ineﬃcient domestic acquisitions also appear in a Bertrand
model with linear demand due to Deneckere and Davidson (1985). For comparison, we
also add a linear Cournot model. The proof proceeds as follows: Above, we have shown
this to hold using a strictly concave demand and assuming Cournot competition with
homogenous goods. In table C.1 below, we show that this will hold both under Bertrand
and Cournot competition. We ﬁrst deﬁne demand in each model, where a is the willingness
to pay, b is the slope of the inverse demand curve under Cournot competition and γ shows
t h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation under Bertrand competition (i.e. γ =0implies that
domestic and foreign goods are unrelated, γ = ∞ that they are perfect substitutes). We
then display ﬁrms’ reduced form proﬁts, πD
h for h = {i,e}, as functions of the demand
characteristics and marginal costs under duopoly. We also repeat the assumptions on
marginal costs for the diﬀerent types of ﬁr m sm a d ei nt h et e x t .




i (0,c) and the critical trade cost cmax for both models (deﬁned as qD
i (cmax,0) =
0). From these expressions, it can be shown that ¯ Ga
i,I(c) is increasing and concave in c,





dc =0for c>t max. This reproduces ¯ Ga
i,I(c)
in the shadowed area in the middle panel of Figure 3.1 (ii).
From the expressions in table 1, it is clear that vi − ve is a strictly convex function
of c, with a single minimum ˜ c>0 for both models. There is also a c∗ > 0 for which
c>c ∗ implies that vi >v e,w h e r e a sc<c ∗ implies that vi <v e. It is also clear that
0 < ˜ c<c ∗ <c max holds in the Cournot model, and that this condition is also fulﬁlled in
the Bertrand model, given that domestic and foreign goods are suﬃciently close substitutes
(i.e. parameter γ is suﬃciently large).
C.3. Region 3 in table 3.1: Gn
e,I <G<G a
i,N
From Figure 2.2(iii), we note that under ineﬃcient ownership there are miltiple equilibria
in the investment game. However, we showed in Section A using risk-domince {N,I}
is selected. Hence, only the eﬃcient ﬁrms i invest greenﬁeld, whereas under eﬃcient
ownership, as illustrated in Figure 2.2(iv), no ﬁrm invests. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation
is then vie = πM
i (0) − G,w h e r e a st h ee ﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation is vei = πM
e (0).Since
vie − vei = −G<0,t h i sl e a d st oa ne ﬃcient acquisition at the price A = vie and the
market structure is M(kS,0).
C.4. Region 4 in table 3.1: Gn
e,I <G<G a
i,N
From Figure 2.2(iii), we note that under ineﬃcient ownership only the eﬃcient ﬁrms e
invest greenﬁeld, whereas under eﬃcient ownership, as illustrated in Figure 2.2(iv), no ﬁrm
invest. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation is then vie = πD
i (c,0),w h e r e a st h ee ﬃcient ﬁrm’s




e (0,c) − G
¢








e (0) < 0, this leads to an eﬃcient acquisition at the price A = vie and the market
structure is M(kS,0).
29C.5. Region 5 in table 3.1: G>G n
e,N
From Figure 2.2(iii) and Figure 2.2(iv), it is clear that investment never takes place. The
ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation is then vie = πM
i (c),w h e r e a st h ee ﬃcient ﬁrm’s valuation is
ve = πM
e (0).S i n c evie − vei = πM
i (c) − πM
e (0) < 0, this leads to an eﬃcient acquisition at
the price A = vie and the market structure is M(kS,0).
D. Proof of Proposition 3
It is straightforward to extend the analysis and allow for more than duopoly in the prod-
uct market interaction. For the case of Cournot competition with concave demand and
assuming parameter values corresponding to Region 2 in Figure 3.1 (ii), where only the















where N is the number of (investing) competitors the acquirer is facing. Again, noting
that Π(c)=vie − vei it can be shown that ineﬃcient ownership occurs for when c is
suﬃciently high, given that demand P(Q) is not too concave. That is, Π(c) exhibits the
same convex shape as in Figure 3.1 (i) so that Lemma 3 also extends beyond duopoly.
However, the above calculation assumes that the acquirer remains active on the market
despite high production costs. It can then be checked that adding more owners removes
ineﬃcient ownership in the Linear Cournot model in table C.1. More speciﬁcally, with N
owners investing in new assets in addition to the non-investing acquirer, it can be checked
that c∗, ˜ c, cmax in Figure 3.1 becomes c∗ = 2Na
2N+N2+2, ˜ c = Na
2N+N2+2 and cmax = (N2−2)a
N+1 a,




(2 − N 2)
(2N + N 2 +2 )( N +1 )
< 0 iﬀ N > 1 (D.2)
Next, we discuss adding more owners to the Bertrand model in table C.1. First, assume
that N =2owners invest in new assets while the ineﬃcient owner does not invest. The
30same calculations yield c∗ = (54γ+21γ2+γ3+36)
216γ+135γ2+27γ3+2γ4+1086a and cmax =
3a(2γ+3)
9γ+γ2+9,w h e r ei tc a nb e
checked that cmax >c ∗ if the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high, i.e. if
γ>18. This shows that ineﬃcient ownership extends into triopoly. However, investigating
quadropoly, i.e. N =3 , this does not allow for ineﬃcient ownership, since it can be shown
that cmax =
32a+28aγ
40γ+9γ2+32 and c∗ =
1024a+2048aγ+1200aγ2+168aγ3
1280γ+1096γ2+372γ3+45γ4+512, which implies that:
c
max − c
∗ = −4 (1152γ+824γ2+192γ3+9γ4+512)(7γ+8)a
(1280γ+1096γ2+372γ3+45γ4+512)(40γ+9γ2+32) < 0. (D.3)
However, a strong assumption in the above text is that ineﬃcient and eﬃcient owners
are equally eﬃcient in using new assets. A more realistic assumption is that the eﬃcient
owner could use both state assets and new assets more eﬃciently. To show the eﬀect,
assume that an eﬃcient owner faces a zero marginal cost irrespective of using new or state
assets, but that ineﬃcient owners face a marginal cost of c>0 when using state assets
but a marginal cost of γc when using new assets, where 0 <γ<1. Hence, in this setting,
ineﬃcient owners are less able to use both state and new assets, which is reasonable. Again,
we assume that the ﬁxed costs are too high for the ineﬃcient owner to invest in new assets
when acquiring (which may or may not yield a lower marginal cost than γc). Assuming
one eﬃcient owner and two ineﬃcient owners, we can then derive ˜ c = a
3γ+5, c∗ =2 a
3γ+5,
cmax = a





(3 − γ)(3γ +5 )




Hence, this example shows that assuming a "symmetric" asymmetry between eﬃcient and
ineﬃcient owners implies that ineﬃcient ownership in the Linear Cournot model extends
to triopoly.
E .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
To illustrate the eﬀect of employment guarantees, suppose that this causes the marginal
cost for the acquirer, irrespective of type, to increase by some constant α.A l l o t h e r
31assumptions remain unchanged. It can then be shown that under the linear Cournot
model:
vie − vei =
1
9
c(5c +1 0 α − 2),
which implies that c∗|α>0 = 2a
5 − 2α<c ∗|α=0 = 2a
5 .
32Table C.1: Deriving the equilibrium market structure under linear Cournot and Bertrand
duopoly models. in Region 2.
Cournot: Bertrand:
Demand: P = a − b(qh + qj),q h = a − Ph − γ(Ph − 1






































Deﬁning Region 2: ¯ Ga
i,I <G< ¯ Gn




































Comparing valuations in Region 2:























Note: 0 < ˜ c<c ∗ <c max, 0 < ˜ c<c ∗ <c max : γ & 4.
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